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Abstract 
Equity crowdfunding platforms are at the center of the digital transformation of early-stage 
venture funding. These digital platforms were originally heralded as a democratizing force in 
early stage finance, due to their role in facilitating the exchange between entrepreneurs and a 
multitude of non-professional small investors (“the crowd”). Equity crowdfunding platforms 
have experienced considerable growth and now attract professional investors including 
business angels. The presence of angels alongside the crowd on equity crowdfunding platforms 
has raised questions whether these digital platforms can continue to play their role in 
democratizing access to capital. Using data from a leading equity crowdfunding platform, we 
examine the interplay between the investment decisions of angels and the crowd. We find 
evidence of information flows in crowdfunding platforms between angels, and from angels to 
the crowd. We find angels play an important role in funding of large ventures, whereas the 
crowd not only fill the funding gaps for such large ventures but also play a pivotal role in the 
funding of small ones. The complementarity between angels and crowd investors seems to 
increase the overall efficiency in an otherwise highly asymmetric and uncertain market, 
confirming that digitization can indeed bring important benefits to venture investment.  
 
Keywords: Equity crowdfunding; Angel investment; Signaling 
JEL codes:  G23, G21, L26, G11, G40 
 
Highlights: 
· Equity crowdfunding platforms attract angels and larger ventures   
· Angels take the lead in large ventures and crowd investors fill funding gaps 
· High-contribution pledges by angels’ act as signals of venture quality 
· Signal effectiveness depends on venture type and social proximity between sender 
and recipient  
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1. Introduction 
Raising finance is one of the most challenging aspects of entrepreneurship (Lee et al., 2015). 
Direct investments into start-up businesses, the majority of which are likely to fail, are high-
risk and start-up entrepreneurs often have limited access to traditional sources of financing. The 
financial crash of 2008 created additional barriers to early stage funding, which in turn gave 
impetus to regulators in the United Kingdom (UK) to facilitate access to capital for early-stage 
ventures (Mollick and Robb, 2016). Regulators actively supported fintech start-ups with the 
goal to reduce the dominance of institutional investors (Hernando, 2016).  
As a result, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has adopted a light touch approach 
towards Equity Crowdfunding (ECF) regulations in the UK (Vulkan et al., 2016). In addition, 
to encourage the public to invest in start-ups, the UK government offered generous tax 
incentives through the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) and the Enterprise 
Investment Scheme (EIS). With these incentives in place and their simple-to-use digital 
interface enabling easy-to-access venture information, ECF platforms quickly gained 
popularity among the public. These digital platforms, which differ significantly from traditional 
sources of financing, have increased optimism regarding the future of start-up finance, with 
ECF raising 1,130 million USD in funding in the UK alone (Statista, 2018), and is now the 
second largest investment category in the UK (by number of companies funded) after venture 
capitalists (Beauhurst, 2017).  
ECF platforms not only attract non-professional small investors (“the crowd”), but also 
attract angel investors and venture capitalists (VC) interested in diversification or convenience. 
As such ECF platforms provide a wide range of potentially high-return early-stage ventures 
with the opportunity to spread risk across multiple ventures and limited administrative burden 
for investors seeking passive investments (AIG, 2016; Landström and Mason, 2016).  
Beyond the convenience, digital ECF platforms also provide entrepreneurs the ability to 
use media such as video and images to provide campaign information and to post real-time 
  4 
updates to signal venture quality. However, information asymmetry still presents a challenge 
on crowdfunding platforms (Ahlers et al., 2015) and finding the right balance between 
facilitating fundraising for new ventures and protecting non-professional investors from ill-
advised decisions and even financial ruin is non-trivial.  
In this respect, some argue that professional and angel investors can play an important 
signaling role on these platforms (Agrawal et al., 2016), making the increasing presence of 
angels and VCs on ECF platforms a positive development (BBB & UKBAA, 2017; Mason and 
Botelho, 2014). Leading ECF platforms such as Crowdcube and CircleUp actively encourage 
co-investment between the crowd and large investors (TechCrunch, 2016). On the other hand, 
some commentators argue that large investors will eventually dominate these platforms and 
weaken the democratizing purpose of these new financing channels (Zhang et al., 2015). 
However, the impact of large investors such as angels on ECF is yet unclear and, to the best of 
our knowledge, prior research has not studied how angels and crowd investors interact on digital 
crowdfunding platforms.  
The evolution of ECF platforms can have long-lasting repercussions for the funding of 
early-stage ventures in terms of the types of ventures being funded, the way in which 
entrepreneurs pitch campaigns, and the nature of innovation (Zhang et al., 2015). It is therefore 
imperative to determine how angels and crowd investors interact on these digital platforms. Are 
angels “crowding out” crowd investors, or can angels help reduce information asymmetries by 
providing valuable and informative signals to the crowd? If angels dominate the platforms, the 
digitization would only benefit large investors and perpetuate funding imbalances associated 
with conventional funding. 
We seek to address these questions by analyzing one of UK’s leading ECF platforms from 
July 2012 until August 2017. Over this period, we observe an increasing trend in terms of both 
volume and fundraising success of large ventures with a funding goal higher than £100,000 on 
the platform (ventures raising funding are called “campaigns” and we use these terms 
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interchangeably). We also notice an increase in the volume and value of investments by large 
investors who correspond to the top 1% in terms of total amount invested and are behaviorally 
similar to business angels. Despite the growth in the number of large ventures and angel 
investors, we observe that crowd investors not only complement angels in large campaigns but 
also play a significant role in funding small campaigns that might not generate sufficient interest 
from angels. Hence, the fear that ECF platforms will evolve into digital marketplaces dominated 
by entrepreneurs with large funding needs and large investors such as angels who can fund 
these needs, seems unfounded. ECF platforms seem to have retained their democratic structure 
and the fast-paced flows of information between diverse investors on these dynamic digital 
platforms have facilitated the access to capital for both small and large ventures, previously 
unserved by traditional offline sources of finance. 
To study the co-investment behavior of angels and crowd investors, we employ the 
theoretical lens of signaling theory (Connelly et al., 2011 for a review). We propose and 
demonstrate that high-contribution pledges (i.e., pledges contributing a high percentage to a 
campaign’s funding goal) serve as an effective investor-generated signal of venture quality 
because they are costly and difficult to imitate. In addition, we propose and show that angel 
investments are more informative compared to crowd investments. We further show that 
perceived similarity between signal recipient and sender enhances information flow resulting 
in angels (compared to crowd investors) reacting more positively to high-contribution pledges 
from other angels. However, the size of the venture moderates this effect, suggesting that the 
effectiveness of angel-generated signals depends on the funding context.  
Our results show that ECF investors rely on high-contribution pledges in general and on 
angel pledges in particular to inform their funding decisions. In light of the signaling role played 
by angel pledges, regulators ought to focus on further incentivizing and facilitating information 
flow that reduces market frictions while protecting crowd investors from being misled (FCA, 
2018). Considering the impersonal nature of digital crowdfunding, information asymmetry and 
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the risks for inexperienced investors, there is a need to enhance standardized regulations on 
investor information disclosure, platform due-diligence, and explicit investor categorization. 
Such regulatory measures would increase transparency and facilitate information flow, further 
enhancing the benefits and efficiency gains from the digitization of early stage finance.  
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses  
2.1. Angel investors in ECF 
Angels are generally defined as “high net worth individuals who invest their own money, either 
alone or with others, directly in unquoted businesses in which there is no family connection” 
(Mason et al., 2016, p.322). Angels are a diverse group (Drover et al., 2017; Wright et al., 2015) 
that varies on demographical and behavioral dimensions (Sørheim and Botelho, 2016). While 
most angels make individual investment decisions other angels invest via “angel networks” 
comparable to investor-led ECF platforms (e.g., Angel’s Den, Syndicate Room) where 
investors pledge by following a lead investor (Agrawal et al., 2016). Other investors invest via 
informal offline investment networks and recently via online company-led ECF platforms like 
the one we study.  
Angels usually concentrate their investments in specific markets or sectors to leverage 
their experience and expertise (Maula et al., 2005; Wright and Westhead, 1998). However, there 
is also evidence that angels diversify their investments with some angels holding a portfolio of 
more than 20 different ventures at a time (BBB and UKBAA, 2017). In addition, whereas angels 
have traditionally maintained personal contact with entrepreneurs (Mason and Botelho, 2014; 
Sørheim and Botelho, 2016), some angels are more hands-off with limited interest in 
managerial support (e.g., Erikson et al., 2003; Sørheim and Landström, 2001). Further, micro-
lending and crowdfunding platforms have gained popularity among younger and less 
experienced angels seeking convenience (Wright et al., 2015) and even hands-on angels who 
are willing to hold passive investments (Landström and Mason, 2016). Hence, ECF platforms 
are likely most attractive to angels seeking diverse ventures and convenience. These investors 
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can in turn influence the investment dynamics on these digital platforms by providing signals 
to other investors. 
2.2 Investor generated signals in ECF 
ECF is characterized by high uncertainty due to the information asymmetry between 
entrepreneurs and investors, the short fundraising time frames (30 to 60 days), the early stage 
of ventures, and limited offline contact with entrepreneurs. In this context, signals of venture 
quality (i.e., informative cues of the venture’s ability to earn a positive cash flow) as proposed 
by signaling theory gain importance (Vismara, 2016a).  
Previous research has identified several campaign-level attributes such as share of equity 
offered, and entrepreneurs’ social, human, and intellectual capital as effective signals (Ahlers 
et al., 2015; Vismara, 2016a). Similarly, communication with investors (Block et. al., 2018), 
narrative style (Parhankangas and Renko, 2017) and visual cues (Mahmood et al., 2018) are 
used by entrepreneurs as signals of venture quality. In addition, signals from sources other than 
entrepreneurs can disambiguate the effect of several entrepreneur-generated signals (Plummer 
et al., 2016). For instance, third-party signals such as endorsements from angels and VCs and 
the investment decisions by other investors have been found to influence start-up success 
(Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2017).  
According to signaling theory, an effective signal is costly, difficult to replicate, and 
contains private information (Spence, 1973). A high-contribution pledge in a specific venture 
can convey the investor’s confidence in the venture and, if costly to replicate, can serve as an 
effective signal of venture quality to other investors. ECF platforms often list previous pledges 
for a specific venture in descending order by value, these digital platforms thus facilitate inter-
investor signaling by giving more visibility to large pledges. Not surprisingly, recent 
crowdfunding studies find that large investments in a venture influence subsequent investors 
(Burtch et al., 2013). Consequently, large investments from early funders result in a higher 
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likelihood of campaign success (Burtch et al., 2013; Vismara, 2016b). Therefore, we 
hypothesize:  
H1: High-contribution pledges in a campaign positively influence the subsequent amount 
pledged by investors in the same campaign. 
2.3 Identity of signal sender 
Bernstein et al. (2016) note that investors may focus more on the identity of previous investors 
to assess venture quality in markets with information asymmetry. Hence, we propose that the 
identity of the investor generating the high-contribution pledge is likely to influence how 
investors interpret investment signals.  
Previous literature on signaling and information exchange stresses the differing 
credibility and trustworthiness of signals depending on their source (e.g., Gomulya and Mishina, 
2017; Kang and Herr, 2006). For instance, observable endorsements from experts have been 
found to be effective signals of venture quality (Courtney et al., 2017; Kim and Viswanathan, 
2018). Similarly, investors’ pledges can be seen as endorsements as they reflect the investors’ 
commitment towards the venture. Given the large distinction in wealth, expertise, and 
experience between angels and crowd investors (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2016), 
investments from angels will be deemed more informative and will thus be more influential in 
generating subsequent pledges for a venture. Further, angel investments are associated with 
higher survival and growth rate of ventures (Kerr et al., 2011) and help attract VCs and other 
institutional investors (Wallmeroth et al., 2018). We therefore hypothesize: 
H2: High-contribution pledges made by angels in a campaign have a greater influence on 
subsequent amount pledged by investors in the same campaign, compared to high 
contribution pledges made by crowd investors. 
2.4 Identity of signal recipient 
Beyond the importance of the signal source, signal decoding, may also play an important role. 
However, decoding signals is susceptible to the characteristics of the recipient (Connelly et al., 
2011). Information exchange theories suggest that individuals perceive information delivered 
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by those similar to themselves as more useful (Brack and Benkenstein, 2012). Social proximity, 
or perceived similarity between individuals, that is “the degree to which people who interact 
are similar in beliefs, education, social status” (Rogers and Bhowmik, 1970, p.525) could 
explain these effects (Cowgill et al., 2009). Prior research shows that crowdfunders from similar 
social categories are more likely to build connections (Greenberg and Mollick, 2017). 
Therefore, due to perceived similarity, a high-contribution pledge from an angel is likely to 
have a greater impact on other angels. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H3: High-contribution pledges by angels in a campaign will have a greater positive effect on 
the subsequent amount pledged by other angel investors in the same campaign, compared to 
high-contribution pledges by crowd investors. 
2.5 Signal context  
Signaling theory identifies costliness and ease of replication as key criteria for signal 
effectiveness (Spence, 1973). High-contribution pledges in campaigns with a large funding goal 
(large campaigns) are significantly larger in monetary value than those in campaigns with a 
small funding goal (small campaigns). They are consequently more difficult to imitate and have 
higher opportunity costs (Connelly et al., 2011). Moreover, large campaigns are subject to 
higher materialization risk, as they are less likely to meet the funding goal compared to small 
campaigns (Belleflamme et al., 2013; Mollick, 2014). Because investment riskiness positively 
moderates people’s willingness to refer to opinions of others with similar sentiments (Gu et al., 
2014), we expect the positive impact of high-contribution pledges made by angel investors to 
be higher in large campaigns than in small campaigns. Our final hypotheses are: 
H4a: Compared to small campaigns, high-contribution pledges by angels in large campaigns 
have a greater positive effect on subsequent amount pledged by other angel investors in those 
same campaigns. 
H4b: Compared to small campaigns, high-contribution pledges by angels in large campaigns 
have a greater positive effect on subsequent amount pledged by crowd investors in those same 
campaigns.  
3. Data 
  10 
We study investor behavior using investment data for 50,999 unique investors and 1,151 unique 
campaigns from July 2012 to August 2017 on one of UK’s leading ECF platforms.1 The 
platform we study acts as the nominee of the participating investors, facilitating future funding 
rounds and preventing share dilution. It is also similar to other major ECF platforms (e.g., 
Crowdcube) in terms of size, type, number of deals completed on the platform, and fee structure. 
It has successfully attracted ventures across 13 sectors, with the most popular being financial 
services, food & drink, digital media, entertainment, and technology.  
The platform attracts a large number of diverse investors, ranging from non-professional 
small investors (typically denominated “the crowd”) to sophisticated and high-net-worth 
individuals. Because investors use multiple platforms, the leading ECF platforms tend to have 
a similar profile of users.2 After the public launch of a campaign on the platform, entrepreneurs 
have 60 days to raise (at least) 100% of the funding goal. If a campaign does not reach its goal 
it is deemed unsuccessful and the venture will not be funded (pledges are returned to investors). 
Campaigns can reach more than 100% of the funding goal (overfunding is allowed) and prior 
to the public launch, entrepreneurs can use the platform to raise funds privately (i.e., private 
launch). 
3.1 Campaign size  
There is considerable variation in the size (funding goal) of the 1,151 campaigns: the average 
funding goal is £197,821 with a standard deviation of £317,633. We conduct a median split of 
campaigns with respect to their size and classify campaigns with a funding goal higher than 
£100,000 as large campaigns, and all others as small campaigns. Table 1 summarizes 
campaign-level attributes by campaign size.  
3.2 Investor categorization  
We also observe heterogeneity among investors in terms of portfolio size (from 1 to 696 
                                               
1 A Non-Disclosure Agreement prevents us from disclosing the identity of the platform. 
2 The CEO of the platform notes: “… platforms (at least the major ones) certainly compete with each other for 
deals; we also compete for investors, although many investors use multiple platforms.” 
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campaigns per investor) and total investment on the platform (from as low as £10 to £14.4 
million). More importantly, the CEO of the platform confirmed the presence of angels alongside 
crowd investors. Although we cannot confirm the identity of each angel on the platform, we 
posit that as long as the behavior of these investors is similar to the behavior reported in previous 
angel investor studies, it is likely that they will be perceived as business angels by other 
investors (Lee and Thorson, 2008). Hence, we classify the top 1% of investors in terms of total 
amount pledged as angel investors (N=510), and the remaining as crowd investors (N=50,489).  
Our analysis reveals that the minimum total amount a single angel investor invested 
during the period of our study is £66,000 (although the amount per pledge could be substantially 
lower). In addition, the behavior of these investors appears similar to that of UK business angels 
outlined in recent surveys (BBB and UKBAA, 2017). Table 2a presents a comparison of several 
key metrics including the median investment value per investor, investors’ location, the 
percentage invested in specific sectors, and the size of the investors’ portfolios. As we can see 
from the table, the angel investors we identified are very similar to those in previous studies. 
We also randomly selected a sample of 153 investors we classified as angels (i.e., top 1% 
of investors) and reviewed in detail their LinkedIn and Crunchbase profiles. By combining the 
information from the two sources, we find that at least 135 (88%) of investors we classified as 
angels also qualified as angels based on the criteria that previous research typically uses to 
profile angels (e.g., UKBAA, 2018).3 Some of the investors could not be uniquely identified, 
either because there were multiple investors with the same name or because some investors had 
limited profile information. However, being able to link 88% of our sample to open public 
profiles of angel investors provides reasonable assurance that our classification is robust. 
Because we identify angel investors based on their total amount pledged, our approach 
could account for angels who make few but very large pledges, and angels who make a larger 
                                               
3 We checked whether an investor met at least one of the following criteria to be classified as angel: (1) having 
successfully founded start-ups, (2) having taken any chief executive level roles in companies that they do not own, 
(3) claiming oneself as a professional/angel investor, and (4) being a fund, a syndicate, or an investment 
organization.  
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number of smaller pledges. In line with existing research on angel behavior (Landström and 
Mason, 2016; Sørheim and Botelho, 2016; Wallmeroth et al., 2018), we observe significant 
heterogeneity among the identified angels. About 3% of angels invested more than one million 
GBP in a single pledge, whereas 28% made single pledges below £100 (these accounted for a 
very small percentage of their entire investments). In addition, although 61% of identified 
angels made fewer than five pledges during the entire period, 5% of angels made more than 90.  
We also observe differences in the timing of investment among angels, with some angels 
investing only during the private launch and others only during the public launch. According to 
the platform CEO, entrepreneurs often “soft circle part of their round through offline angels” 
before the public launch. Angels who invest during the private period through offline contacts 
are likely to treat ECF as an asset class similar to traditional offline investments, maintaining 
direct relationship with entrepreneurs and being hands-on. However, investors who invest 
during the public launch period may consider ECF to be a different asset class, favoring the 
convenience and hands-off nature of ECF.  
In our dataset, we identified those angels who only made pledges during the private 
launch period (82 angels satisfy this condition) and those who only made investments during 
the public launch period (168 angels). Angels who only invest during the private launch period 
likely reveal a preference for an offline connection with entrepreneurs. However, in terms of 
investment behavior we found no significant difference in the average amount pledged 
(£117,370 vs. £146,937, p-value = 0.25), the number of campaigns invested in, preference for 
small versus large campaigns, and total amount invested (see, Table 2b). Hence, although 
angels may differ in their preference for involvement in ventures (Sørheim and Botelho, 2016) 
the investment behavior on the ECF platform is still similar. In contrast, we observe significant 
differences between investment behavior of angels and that of crowd investors (see, Table 3). 
For instance, in large campaigns angels make approximately six times the number of pledges 
of crowd investors, and pledge around 121 times the amount of crowd investors. These results 
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provide further assurance that our strategy for angel identification is robust, identifies hands-
on and hands-off angels, and distinguishes angel investors from non-professional small 
investors.  
3.3 Evolution of the platform 
Since its inception, the platform has registered an increase in both the value and number of 
pledges. Figures 1 and 2 present monthly total amount pledged and monthly number of pledges 
between July 2012 and August 2017. Splitting the data by campaign size (Figures 3 and 4), we 
note a strong increase in the number and success rate of large campaigns over time. We also 
observe growth in the number of angels joining the platform and the value of angel pledges, 
with the number and amount pledged by crowd investors remaining stable (Figures 5 and 6).  
The simultaneous growth in large investors and large campaigns on the platform could 
support the arguments of those who claim the participation of angels and large investors on 
ECF platforms poses a risk to the democratizing role of the digitization in early stage finance. 
However, the increasing presence of angels is not enough to provide a conclusive answer. One 
also needs to study angel influence to determine whether angels have achieved a position of 
dominance. To this end analysis of campaign dynamics provides further insights. 
3.4 Campaign dynamics 
The temporal funding dynamics suggest significant differences between successful and 
unsuccessful campaigns. As an example, we plot the progression curves (i.e., cumulative 
percentage of funding goal fulfilled) for a successful and an unsuccessful campaign with the 
same funding goal (£100,000) and comparable number of pledges (Figures 7 and 8). Dots 
represent the percentage contribution per pledge considering the campaign goal, and the shaded 
area shows the cumulative percentage raised. The progression curve for the successful 
campaign shows several moments at which the curve rises sharply. These “jumps” correspond 
to high-contribution pledges. For simplicity, we will regard pledges accounting for more than 
10% of the funding goal for a campaign as jumps (these pledges also correspond to the top 1% 
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pledges in terms of percentage contribution). The successful campaign received three jump 
pledges contributing 35%, 10%, and 20% of the goal. The progression curve for the 
unsuccessful campaign shows no jump pledges. 
We observe a similar pattern for most successful and unsuccessful campaigns, suggesting 
jumps play a pivotal role in the success of campaigns. In general, successful campaigns had 
eight times more jump pledges compared to unsuccessful campaigns (3.54 vs. 0.46). However, 
these high-contribution pledges do not fulfil the entire funding needs for a successful campaign. 
On average jumps account for about 54.16% of a campaign’s goal (median of 11.11%). Hence, 
campaign success depends on pledges from more investors than only those associated with the 
high-contribution pledges.  
We also observe that both the crowd and angel investors make jumps, but there is a 
concentration of angel jumps in larger campaigns. As a result, angels contribute more to the 
funding goal of large campaigns but the crowd also seems to be playing a fundamental role (see, 
Table 4). 
Finally, a higher percentage of angel jumps in successful campaigns (vs. unsuccessful 
campaigns) took place during the public launch period (64% vs. 46%), suggesting the 
importance of jump observability. However, the dynamics of inter-investor information flow 
are still unclear because we do not know when and how angel jumps influence a campaign’s 
success. Understanding these dynamics will allow us to determine whether angels dominate the 
platform, reducing the influence of crowd investors, or whether the co-existence of angels and 
crowd investors provides significant benefits for investors and entrepreneurs. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
To study whether and how jumps, especially jump pledges by angels, influence the behavior of 
investors on this platform, we adopt a fixed effects lognormal model of pledge value: 𝐿𝑜𝑔	(𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒-./) = 𝛽𝐽𝑢𝑚𝑝	𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠./ + 𝛾𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐷𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠./ +𝛿𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟	𝐷𝑦𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑠-/ + 𝜃𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠. + 𝜇- + 𝑣/ + 𝜖-./  
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The dependent variable 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒-./ denotes the amount pledged by investor i in campaign 
j at investment occasion t, and Jump Metrics represents a vector of our independent variables. 
Campaign Dynamics, Investor Dynamics, and Campaign Attributes are vectors of control 
variables that reflect campaign- and investor-specific, time-variant and time-invariant features 
(we will specify below). The vectors of parameters 𝛽 , 𝛾 , 𝛿 , and 𝜃  correspond to model 
coefficients, 𝜇-  captures investor-level fixed effects, 𝑣/  includes yearly and day-of-week 
dummies, and 𝜖-./ represents independently and identically distributed normal error terms. 
We created two independent variables: Jump Occurred and Angel Jump. Jump Occurred 
is an indicator variable equal to one once a campaign has received the first jump pledge, and 
zero any time before that, allowing us to test if a high-contribution pledge serves as a signal of 
campaign quality and whether it impacts subsequent investor behavior (H1). Angel Jump is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the most recent jump to a campaign is made by an angel with 
a visible profile, and zero otherwise, allowing us to test the impact of an angel-generated signal 
(H2). The value of Angel Jump is updated only when a new jump occurs. 
We also included several control variables in our model. Because investors are likely to 
perceive jumps accounting for 90% versus 20% of a campaign goal differently, we included 
Jump Size as a control. This variable measures the percentage contribution to the funding goal 
of the most recent jump made to the campaign (it updates when a new jump occurs). Because 
the effect of a signal is likely to diminish over time (Estrin and Khavul, 2016), we included 
Jump Recency as an additional control that corresponds to the number of days passed since the 
most recent jump.  
We also included linear and squared terms of Cumulative Percent Raised for each 
campaign to control for the (possibly non-linear) effect of a campaign’s fundraising progress 
and investor herd behavior. Previous research has shown herd behavior can occur when 
campaigns are close to reaching their funding goal (Agrawal et al., 2014). Considering that 
investors monitor campaign’s progression and accumulate knowledge (Hu and Gorbatai, 2015), 
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follow-up investments in the same campaign are likely to differ from initial investments.  
Therefore, we included Investor Campaign Experience as an additional control that records the 
number of times an investor has previously invested in the campaign. To account for angels’ 
sectoral experience and habitual investment behavior (Maula et al., 2005), we included Investor 
Sectoral Experience dummy (taking the value one if the investor has previously invested in 
campaigns of the same sector, and zero otherwise).  
We also accounted for observed heterogeneity across investors by including control 
variables such as Investor Cumulative Amount Pledged (calculated across all campaigns) and 
Days Since Investor’s Last Pledge (to account for investor-specific recency effects). We also 
controlled for the impact of entrepreneur- and campaign-related factors such as the percentage 
of equity offered to investors (Campaign Equity Offered), the effect of time pressure (Days 
Until Campaign Expiration), and the interaction between entrepreneurs and investors during 
the private launch period (Private Launch Pledge). Further, to control for competitive effects 
across campaigns we included Daily Number of Active Campaigns, which counts the number 
of active campaigns on the same day of the pledge. Finally, year-specific dummy variables and 
day-specific dummy variables were included to control for yearly trends, and day-specific 
factors, respectively.   
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Results summary 
Table 5 (Models 1 through 6) and Table 6 (Models 7 through 10) present the main results. We 
report the results of the model with Jump Occurred (JO) as the independent variable using the 
entire sample to test H1 (Model 1), and a full model with Angel Jump (AJ) to test H2 (Model 
2). We also estimate models for angels and crowd investors separately using standardized 
variables to test H3 (Models 3 and 4). Finally, to test H4a and H4b we repeat the analysis with 
standardized variables but split the sample by campaign size (Models 5 and 6). We further 
report the four sub-models for angels and crowd investors in large and small campaigns (see 
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Models 7 through 10).  
Consistent with H1, we find that a jump pledge positively affects the amount invested by 
subsequent investors (Model 1: βJO = 0.127, p-value<0.001). The increase is significant as 
investors pledge 13.5% (0.135 = 𝑒J.LMN − 1) more in a campaign in which previously a jump 
pledge had occurred, compared to when no previous jump pledge was present. When the jump 
pledge in a campaign is from an angel investor, we observe an additional positive impact, even 
after controlling for the jump. If the jump pledge is from an angel investor subsequent pledges 
increase by an extra 6.0%, supporting H2 (Model 2: βAJ = 0.058, p-value<0.001). We also note 
that the signaling effect of jumps decays over time as we find a negative effect of Jump Recency 
(Model 2: βJR = -0.003, p-value<0.001).  
We find that an angel jump increases the amount per pledge by 7.0% for angels and 5.5% 
for the crowd. To explore differences in behavior between angels and crowd investors we 
conducted split-sample analysis by investor type using standardized variables. We find that 
Angel Jump has a greater positive impact on angels compared to crowd investors (Model 3: βAJ 
= 0.015, p-value = 0.079; versus Model 4: βAJ = 0.012, p-value<0.001) supporting H3 and 
suggesting angels react more positively to signals sent by their peers than by crowd investors. 
Using standardized variables, split-sample analysis by campaign size shows that the 
positive effect of Angel Jump is significant in large campaigns (Model 5: βAJ = 0.009, p-
value<0.001) but insignificant in small campaigns (Model 6: βAJ = 0.003, p-value = 0.460). This 
supports the argument that investors perceive angel jumps as costly signals only in large 
campaigns, hence, influencing subsequent pledges. In contrast, angel jumps in small campaigns 
do not change subsequent pledge behavior, suggesting that lower valued jumps are not costly 
to replicate and hence not perceived as effective signals of campaign quality. These results 
support the signal costliness hypotheses (H4a and H4b). 
Consistent with the results from the analysis based on the entire sample, in Models 5 and 
6 our results suggest that the effect size of Angel Jump is greater in large campaigns than in 
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small campaigns for all types of investors. We find that a previous angel jump increases 
subsequent pledges by 14.1% and 12.6% in large and small campaigns, respectively. In addition, 
the differences in beta coefficients for the models of investor type by campaign size confirm 
that Angel Jump has a greater impact in large campaigns (for angels compare Models 7: βAJ = 
0.030, p-value<0.001 vs. Model 8: βAJ = 0.027, p-value = 0.069; for the crowd compare Model 
9: βAJ = 0.009, p-value<0.001 vs. Model 10: βAJ = -0.001, p-value = 0.843). Again, these results 
further support the signal costliness hypotheses (H4a and H4b). 
5.2 Additional analyses and robustness checks 
5.2.1 Alternative identification approach for angel investors 
We identified angels based on total amount invested on the platform, an approach that could 
potentially leave out angels not particularly active or who have joined the platform in a later 
period of the sample. For example, an inactive angel or an angel who joined the platform 
towards the end of the sample period might make a single large pledge but might not meet the 
top 1% total investment threshold. To account for such instances, we tested our hypotheses 
using alternative identification approaches (see Appendix, Table A1). We identified the top 1% 
of investors considering three alternatives: (1) the value of the largest pledge, (2) the average 
value pledged per campaign, and (3) the average value per pledge. The alternative specifications 
classify 510, 509, and 510 investors as angels, respectively, with an overlap with the original 
classification of 67%, 70%, and 78%. Further, to ensure that we accurately capture offline 
angels, we also classified as angels those investors who have made at least one jump and one 
pledge in the private launch period. This resulted in 726 investors and a 54% overlap with our 
original approach. We find that under all four alternative classification approaches Angel Jump 
has a positive and significant impact on subsequent pledges (see Models 11 to 14, Table A1). 
Hence, the impact of angel jumps is robust to the criteria used for angel identification. 
5.2.2 Alternative jump definition  
As an additional robustness check, we tested our hypotheses using an alternative jump 
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definition that relies on absolute monetary value. In this scenario, we classify pledges greater 
than £20,000.50 (i.e., top 1% in terms of value per pledge) as jumps. Results with this 
alternative specification are again consistent with the main model results (see, Table A2). 
5.2.3 Follow-up investments 
Signal effectiveness could also depend on initial versus follow-up investments. We study 
follow-up investments using two approaches: firstly, we look at follow-up investments by an 
investor within the same campaign and, secondly, we evaluate differences in investments in 
ventures seeking initial versus higher rounds of financing. Although we controlled for follow-
up investments in Models 1 through 10 (see, Tables 5 and 6) using the Investor Campaign 
Experience variable, here we provide an additional analysis using models estimated separately 
for different sample splits: initial investments versus follow-up investments. 
We observe that 9,008 investors have made follow-up investments to the same campaign. 
We find Angel Jump having a greater impact on initial investments (Model 18: βAJ = 0.065, p-
value<0.001,) compared with follow-up investments to the same campaign (Model 19: βAJ = 
0.052, p-value<0.001). As for ventures running multiple rounds of fundraising campaigns,4 we 
observe that 103 ventures have successfully raised funds from 223 campaigns. 5  We 
distinguished investments in initial and higher (³ 2) rounds and repeated our analysis. We find 
a stronger effect of Angel Jump on investments made to initial rounds (Model 20: βAJ = 0.083, 
p-value<0.001) compared to investments made to campaigns seeking additional rounds of 
financing (Model 21: βAJ = 0.046, p-value<0.001). 
Consistent with arguments that signals are more effective when information asymmetries 
are more severe (e.g., Chen et al., 2012), our results show that angel jumps have a stronger 
positive impact on investors pledging in initial versus follow-up investments.  
                                               
4 We also controlled for the impact of follow-up investments across multiple rounds of the same venture by 
including a dummy variable (Investor Previous Round Experience) indicating whether an investor had already 
invested in a previous round. We find that the impact of angel jumps on investment behavior is robust to the 
inclusion of the additional investment round control (βAJ = 0.054, p-value<0.001). Finally, models by investor type 
are also consistent with our overall results. Detailed results available from the authors upon request. 
5 We only focus on campaigns that were successful and reached their funding goal in more than one round.  
  20 
5.2.4 Investor syndicating behavior  
Angels typically engage in co-investing and syndicating behavior (Mason et al., 2016). In our 
platform, angels who co-invest in the campaign’s private launch period are more likely to build 
informal offline connections. These connections could provide an alternative explanation for 
the results we find and the role of ECF platforms in open and public information dissemination 
to be less important for the effects we find. 
To test for these alternative explanations, we focus on 342 angels who pledged during 
the private launch and build a 342-by-342 adjacency matrix of whether two angels have co-
existed in any campaign’s private launch period or not. The density of this proxy network is 
very low (0.08), meaning that among the 58,311 (342*341/2) potential angel pairs, only 4,722 
engaged in co-investment in private launch periods, and 77% of these pairs co-invested only 
once. Therefore, our results indicate very limited evidence of (informal) syndication or offline 
networking. Instead the signaling effects occur due to the information flow between investors 
facilitated by the digital channel. 
5.3 Discussion 
The digitization of early-venture funding through ECF platforms provides the opportunity to 
close funding gaps by serving ventures that institutional investors are unwilling to consider. It 
facilitates the exchange between many common investors and entrepreneurs, overcoming the 
difficulties typically posed by offline channels, such as access to angels, physical distance and 
the lack of social capital. In the past years, the venture diversity (in sector and scale), the upside 
potential of early-stage ventures, and the convenience offered by ECF platforms have attracted 
sophisticated and professional investors such as business angels who now invest alongside 
small non-professional investors. The influx of large investors, although providing 
opportunities to entrepreneurs, could constitute a threat to the democratizing role of ECF 
platforms, if large investors crowd out smaller and non-professional ones.  
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Our study sheds light on this issue and responds to a call for evidence-based research on 
the interaction between angels and the crowd (Hellmann and Thiele, 2015; Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to rely on investors’ 
pledging decisions to empirically identify and categorize ECF investors, adding to the insights 
obtained through previous surveys and interviews (e.g., BBB and UKBAA, 2017). 
Our results show that the growth of large campaigns and the presence of angel investors 
on the ECF platform go hand-in-hand. Angels invest in large campaigns and are essential to 
their success on the platform. Despite the growth in angel investors, we find crowd investors 
still play an important role in bridging funding gaps in large campaigns. For small campaigns 
that do not attract angel investments, crowd investors are instead the fundamental source of 
funding. This angel-crowd complementarity suggests that ECF has maintained its democratic 
credentials.  
In addition, the presence of angels and the visibility of their funding behavior via digital 
ECF platforms help reduce information asymmetry in early-stage financing. Such asymmetries 
typically generate market frictions and inefficiencies. Angel’s investment decisions, and 
specifically their high-contribution pledges, act as informative signals of venture quality. 
Hence, crowdfunding platforms facilitate information flow from more experienced, and 
possibly better-informed investors, to the crowd. In a context where regulators fear for the 
financial health of small non-professional investors, our results suggest that the digital 
environment of ECF platforms with real-time and fast-paced flows of information benefit 
novice investors as they can easily observe the investment behavior of angels.  
Although a large body of ECF literature has explored the effects of entrepreneur-
generated signals on investor behavior (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2015), how investors interact and 
how information flows among investors is seldom studied. We provide an important 
contribution in this regard. We find that the digitization of venture financing has not only 
allowed entrepreneurs to communicate easily to a larger and more diverse group of investors, 
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it has also allowed investors to observe the decisions of other investors, facilitating inter-
investor information flow. Hence, the digitization of early stage finance has been able to reduce 
the limits imposed by the need for physical and social proximity. 
Our work also addresses the call for multidisciplinary crowdfunding research (McKenny 
et al., 2017). We combine insights from information economics, sociology, and 
entrepreneurship to shed light on the impact of investor-generated signals on ECF platforms. 
Although our results are novel and contribute to signaling research in crowdfunding literature, 
they are also consistent with more general signaling theories of social proximity (e.g., Cowgill 
et al., 2009) and signal costliness (e.g., Connelly et al., 2011). For example, we demonstrate 
that information flow between investors depends on the identity of the signal sender, signal 
recipient, and context.  
6. Policy Implications 
The regulator’s support and sympathetic approach towards digital ECF (globally and especially 
in the UK) has increased the flow of capital to early-stage ventures and facilitated innovation. 
As ECF platforms evolve and mature, concerns arise regarding the protection of the interests 
of small investors. While some contend that the U.S. regulatory framework for ECF provides 
little protection to small investors (Shiller, 2015), other suggest that the UK regulators are too 
“fintech friendly” and compromise stringency in assessing investor qualification (Zhang et al., 
2015). 
For example, in the UK, the current regulatory framework requires investor self-
certification as high-net-worth, sophisticated, or everyday (crowd) investors. In the ECF 
platform we study, we find that a quarter of investors self-certified as high-net-worth 
individuals invested less than £500 over the entire period, whereas 2% of those self-certified as 
“everyday investors” invested more than £66,000 (our threshold for angel identification). These 
results raise concerns regarding the accuracy of the current investor self-assessment procedure 
of ECF platforms. It is necessary for regulators to ensure standardized information collection 
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across platforms via in-depth questionnaires on investors’ financial acumen, investment 
experience, qualifications, and wealth. More importantly, using the behavior-based investor 
categorization that we employ in the current study, platforms could better segment investors 
and facilitate information flow by making these categories visible to platform members. Further, 
there is a need to educate inexperienced investors regarding the risks of investing in early stage 
ventures. Currently, ECF platforms inform investors via “risk warning” pages, blogs, and 
forums. There is a need to better explain various types of risks and make risk warnings more 
visible on ECF platforms. 
In addition, there is evidence that some entrepreneurs send false signals to the market 
by making anonymous large investment in their own ventures (Burtch et al., 2013). Not 
surprisingly, the FCA has recently raised concerns regarding insufficient information 
transparency on digital funding platforms and has proposed to refine its current regulations on 
crowdfunding sector (FCA, 2018). Indeed, signaling across investors plays a significant role on 
ECF platforms and anonymous high-contribution pledges could pose a risk to investors less 
able to verify investors’ credentials. In light of these concerns, to protect investors in general 
and crowd investors in particular, we urge regulators to consider greater transparency and 
information disclosure on ECF platforms for large pledges above a certain threshold. Platforms 
could require investors pledging more than 10% of a campaign’s funding goal to disclose their 
real identities (instead of usernames), professional social network information (e.g., LinkedIn 
or Crunchbase pages), or authenticated personal webpages.  
Finally, considering that many successfully funded ventures on ECF platforms eventually 
fail (Signori and Vismara, 2016) there is a greater need for regulators to impose standardized 
due diligence procedures for platforms to protect all investors. Many ECF investors, including 
angels, rely on platforms to screen ventures. Although the FCA requires platforms to conduct 
due diligence, in practice the background checks are not standardized across platforms. With 
the growth in funding volume raised by ECF platforms, such lack of clarity is no longer 
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desirable. Regulators ought to impose more rigorous and standardized risk assessment of 
ventures featured by ECF platforms. Our findings support FCA’s recent focus on tightening the 
regulatory framework for platforms and the demand side (i.e., ventures) of the crowdfunding 
sector (FCA, 2018). 
7.  Conclusion 
Our analysis of one of the UK’s leading ECF platforms provides an optimistic outlook for the 
future of digital crowdfunding. With greater transparency and standardized regulation, we 
believe that digital crowdfunding platforms can continue to support the complementary co-
existence of angels and the crowd, greatly facilitating early-stage finance.  
Our study is not devoid of limitations. Even though the ECF platform we study is 
representative of other leading platforms, and we proposed a robust angel identification strategy 
based on pledging behavior, future research could study the generalizability of our findings 
across platforms and alternative identification strategies. In addition, future research could 
explore in more detail the type of angels attracted by ECF platforms and whether angels treat 
ECF as a different asset class. As ECF grows, we expect to see greater involvement of angels, 
providing more opportunities to study their behavior.  
Prior research has found that ventures with angel investments have higher survival and 
growth rates (Kerr et al., 2011). Thus, from a practical and policy perspective, it is important to 
study whether the long-term performance of ventures funded by angels on ECF platforms 
mirrors that of ventures that obtain funding via conventional means of finance. Although we 
find no evidence of syndication, investors (particularly angels) may accumulate social capital 
through co-investments and form syndicates as the ECF market matures. Hence, future research 
could explore whether syndicates emerge on digital platforms.  
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Table 1: Average Campaign Attributes by Campaign Size 
 Large Campaigns 
(N=640) 
Small Campaigns 
(N=511) 
Pre-money Valuation (£`000) 4,429.28 922.61 
Funding Goal (£`000) 315.88 49.96 
Campaign Equity Offered (%) 12.54 10.46 
Number of Investors 153.25 55.52 
Final Funded Rate 0.88 1.09 
 
 
 
Table 2a: Comparison of Angel Behavioral Metrics 
  BBB & UKBAA (2017)* Current Study 
Median Value of Investments (£) 45,000 80,000 
Median Number of Investments Made 2 1 
Percentage Invested in 1-5 Companies 79% 83% 
Percentage Invested in 10+ Companies 7% 6% 
Percentage Located in London 35% 40% 
Percentage Invested in ICT/Digital Tech Sector 81% 82% 
*All figures obtained and calculated from angel investment metrics in 2016 as reported by BBB&UKBAA 
 
 
Table 2b: Comparison of Private- and Public-Only Angels 
(mean values reported) 
Private-Only 
Angels 
(N=82) 
Public-Only 
Angels  
(N=168) 
p-value* 
Total Amount Invested (£) 253,276 387,141 0.34 
Average Amount Invested per Campaign (£) 117,370 146,937 0.25 
Number of Campaigns Invested 1.99 1.43 0.24 
Percentage of Investments in Large Campaigns 0.94 0.95 0.73 
Average Percentage Contribution per Pledge 0.22 0.30 0.08 
*p-value for two-sample t-test comparing Private-Only and Public-Only Angels 
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Table 3: Average Investor Level Metrics by Type 
 
Angel Investors 
(N=510) 
Crowd Investors 
(N=50,489) 
Total Amount Pledged (£) 254,707 2,110 
Total Amount Pledged to Large Campaigns (£) 239,783 1,831 
Average Amount Invested per Campaign (£) 142,862 1,401 
Number of Pledges Made  18 3 
Number of Pledges Made to Large Campaigns 13 2 
Number of Campaigns Invested  11 2 
Number of Days since Registration with the Platform   362 89 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics on Jump Pledges 
 
Successful Campaigns 
(N=456) 
Failed Campaigns 
(N=695) 
Number of Jump Pledges per Campaign 3.54 0.46 
Total Contribution of Jump Pledges per Campaign 0.72 0.08 
 
Angel Jumps 
(N=823) 
Crowd Jumps 
(N=1,111) 
Share of Jumps Associated with Large Campaigns 0.74 0.41 
Average Size of Jumps*  0.47 0.21 
Average Size of Jumps in Large Campaigns* 0.33 0.15 
*Measured as share of contribution to campaign funding goal
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Table 5: Results 
 Model 1 
Pooled 
Model 2 
Pooled 
Model 3 
Angel  
Model 4 
Crowd  
Model 5 
Large 
Campaign 
Model 6 
Small 
Campaign 
       
Angel Jump  0.058*** 0.015* 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.003 
   (0.008) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Jump Occurred 0.127*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.045*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Jump Size -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
Jump Recency -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.066*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.013*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Cumulative Percent 
Raised -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.132*** -0.003 0.024** -0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) 
Squared Cumulative 
Percent Raised 0.0002 0.0002* 0.109*** -0.002 -0.311*** 0.001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.020) (0.004) (0.054) (0.007) 
Days Until Campaign 
Expiration 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Campaign Equity 
Offered -0.003 -0.006 0.041*** -0.006*** -0.025*** 0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Private Launch Pledge 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.003 0.028*** 0.035*** -0.015*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Daily Number of 
Active Campaigns -0.001* -0.001* 0.020 -0.007*** -0.007** -0.018*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Days since Investor's 
Last Pledge 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.058*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.028*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Investor Cumulative 
Amount Pledged -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.019 -0.133*** -0.126*** -0.085*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Investor Campaign 
Experience 0.243*** 0.242*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.027*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Investor Sectoral 
Experience 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.025** 0.012*** 0.016*** -0.006 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
       
Observations 144,890 144,890 8,492 136,398 112,394 32,496 
BIC 339,913.900 339,850.500 17,857.510 132,671.000 121,996.300 23,372.360 
Note: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. All models include an intercept. Model 3 through 6 
estimated using standardized variables; we report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Results by Investor Type and Campaign Size 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 
Angel  
Large 
Campaign 
Angel  
Small 
Campaign 
Crowd  
Large 
Campaign 
Crowd 
Small 
Campaign 
     
Angel Jump  0.030*** 0.027* 0.009*** -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.002) (0.005) 
Jump Occurred  0.454*** 0.074*** 0.005* 0.041*** 
 (0.031) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) 
Jump Size -0.021 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.030) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) 
Jump Recency -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.016*** -0.010** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.002) (0.004) 
Cumulative Percent Raised -0.226*** -0.001 0.051*** -0.003 
 (0.053) (0.028) (0.009) (0.009) 
Squared Cumulative Percent Raised 0.744** 0.004 -0.417*** 0.00008 
 (0.354) (0.025) (0.053) (0.007) 
Days Until Campaign Expiration 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.037*** 0.018*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.003) (0.005) 
Campaign Equity Offered -0.006 0.056*** -0.026*** 0.020*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004) 
Private Launch Pledge -0.007 -0.019 0.038*** -0.013** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.004) (0.006) 
Daily Number of Active Campaigns 0.024 0.006 -0.010*** -0.021*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.003) (0.005) 
Days since Investor's Last Pledge 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.027*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.002) (0.004) 
Investor Cumulative Amount Pledged 0.005 -0.050 -0.135*** -0.090*** 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.004) (0.007) 
Investor Campaign Experience 0.082*** 0.011 0.056*** 0.034*** 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) 
Investor Sectoral Experience 0.036*** -0.001 0.015*** -0.007* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004) 
     
Observations 5,859 2,633 106,535 29,863 
BIC 12,773.250 4,133.809 102,732.500 18,010.440 
Note: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. All models include an intercept and are estimated using 
standardized variables; we report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Monthly Amount Pledged by All Investors 
(July 2012 to August 2017) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Monthly Number of Pledges by All Investors 
(July 2012 to August 2017) 
 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1 3 5 7 9 1113151719212325272931333537394143454749515355575961
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
am
ou
nt
 p
le
dg
ed
 (i
n 
m
ill
io
ns
)
am
ou
nt
 o
f p
le
dg
e 
(in
 m
ill
io
ns
)
month
cumulative total amount pledged (all investors) total amount pledged (all investors)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
N
o.
 o
f p
le
dg
es
 (i
n 
th
ou
sa
nd
s)
N
o.
 o
f p
le
dg
es
 (i
n 
th
ou
sa
nd
s)
month
cumulative total No. of pledges (all investors) total No. of pledges (all investors)
  30 
 
Figure 3: Monthly Number of Newly Added Campaigns by Size with Fitted Trends 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Monthly Number of Successful Campaigns by Size with Fitted Trends 
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Figure 5: Number of Newly Joined Investors by Type and Month with Fitted Trends 
 
 
  
 
Figure 6: Average Size of Pledges by Investor Type and Month with Fitted Trends 
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Figure 7: Campaign Progression for a Successful Campaign 
(the campaign reached 129% of the £100,000 goal with three pledges contributing ³ 10%) 
  
Figure 8: Campaign Progression for an Unsuccessful Campaign 
(the camapign reached 74% of the £100,000 goal without any single pledge contributing ³ 10%) 
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APPENDIX: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
Table A1: Alternative Angel and Jump Identification 
 
Model 11 
Alternative 
Angel 1 
Model 12 
Alternative 
Angel 2 
Model 13 
Alternative 
Angel 3 
Model 14 
Alternative 
Angel 4 
Model 15 
Alternative 
Jump 
       
Angel Jump  0.146*** 0.171*** 0.141*** 0.027*** 0.104*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Jump Occurred 0.023** 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.111*** 1.443*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.054) 
      
Control Variables Included YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 144,890 144,890 144,890 144,890 144,890 
BIC 399,915.500 399,714.200 399,993.000 339,908.800 398,057.900 
Note: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table A2: Follow-up Investments 
 Model 18 
Initial 
Model 19 
Follow-up 
Model 20 
Initial 
Model 21 
Follow-up 
     
Angel Jump 0.065** 0.052** 0.083*** 0.046*** 
 (0.030) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011) 
Jump Occurred  0.104*** 0.078*** 0.041*** 0.176*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
     
Control Variables Included YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 20,431 32,507 22,131 17,411 
BIC 36,432.290 77,245.790 40,393.640 39,869.220 
Note: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. All models estimated using standardized variables; we 
report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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